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Security Information **WORKING DRAFT**

**MOB**

21 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPP

25X1A

FROM: SF [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Comments on PSB D-24, "Program of Psychological Preparation for Stalin's Passing from Power."

1. SR Division concurs in principle with the comments expressed in the subject paper. We feel, however, the following additional factors should be included for consideration by the PSB:

a. Effect of the latest developments of the 19th Party Congress on the course of action outlined in the subject paper. Specifically, the following points should be considered:

(1) Elimination of the Politburo and its replacement by the Presidium.

(2) Stalin's role in the new party and state structures.

(3) Any indication that the changes brought about by the 19th Party Congress have created machinery necessary for the gradual and orderly transition of power from Stalin to the new group or individual..

(4) Malenkov's role in the new power complex.

b. Examination of the other conflicts within the Soviet structure:

(1) The Military versus the political apparatus.

(2) Security apparatus versus the Military and the Political.

c. Although Stalin's eventual death can be regarded as a certainty, strains between the individuals and groups connected with the problem of succession should not be placed in the same category. We have no evidence that the existing "strains" between the individuals and groups are of such magnitude that they will culminate automatically in the internal conflict or lead to the inter-party struggle. Moreover, we

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should not assume that despite the existing rivalries, jealousies, etc., there may not be an orderly transition of power which would assure at least a short period of order and tranquility until the existing or created frictions would have sufficient time to fertilize. We must certainly assume that Stalin is fully aware of this instability and probably has devoted considerable time to making sure that this accomplishment will not be undermined by internal dissension. In such a case, it would be more profitable for us to advance our attack on two separate but related fronts. One attack directed to develop new and intensify old personal frictions among the top leadership; and another coordinated attack directed to place the military in opposition to the political apparatus.

2. SR/CPP assumes that the detailed paper which is now being prepared on "knowledge" will serve as a basis for a coordinated reply to the subject document.

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COMMENTS ON PSB-24

1. This draft paper, dated October 14, 1952, ignores entirely the fact that considerable groundwork has been done by various agencies on the basic theme. Its sole purpose seems to be to initiate a joint conception of the problem in spite of the fact that a number of decisions have already been arrived at. The most important of these has been an agreement in principle that diplomatic silence will be maintained by this government in the event of Stalin's death and that attempts will be made to obtain parallel official action from friendly governments.

2. Except for a suggestion in Paragraph 6.d., relating to general Soviet vulnerabilities, the PSB paper is solely concerned with the almost impossible task of exploiting or ~~formulating~~ tensions within the Presidium prior to and subsequent to Stalin's demise. This is certainly a desirable objective but doesn't fall within any present or foreseeable capabilities of this government or this agency unless a broad variety of indirect actions are organized with the idea of creating situations capable of producing divisive tensions at the top. In other words, although one can not disagree with the desirability of producing such affects as are outlined in the PSB paper, our primary targets will have to be sought for at a much lower level. This fact is being ignored by PSB.

3. Within the context of "placing maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power" it is suggested that consideration be given to the three principles and six ancillary Objectives outlined in the previous paper submitted by the undersigned. Unless we select our targets within areas that U.S. overt and covert capabilities can attain and affect, ~~entire~~ plan will be nothing more than a pious declaration of intent. By proper exploitation of this theme in a definitely coordinated policy framework we will be able to place the entire Soviet empire in a defensive position and increase disruption beginning at the low levels and mounting progressively towards the summit of the pyramid. No other technique will grant these positive results.

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Psychological Staff Division

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